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Canadian Constitutional Identities
Constitutions are stories nations tell about themselves. Despite the famous
declaration in the Constitution Act, 1867 that the "Provinces of Canada...Desire...a
Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom," most of Canada's
constitutional history can be understood as the search for a distinctly Canadian
constitutional identity Canadians have always looked to their constitutional
instruments to both reflect and produce a particular vision of the nation and its
citizens. This article focuses on the search for Canada s constitutional identity
during its first century as a nation, from Confederation until the 1960s. Drawing on
a varied array of sources and voices, this article argues that the powerful yearning
for identity operated as a driving force in Canadian constitutional law, politics, and
culture in an era before the catalytic arrival of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
Les constitutions sont des recits que les nations racontent sur elles-m~mes.
Malgre la declaration solennelle dans le preambule de la Loi constitutionnelle,
1867, que , les provinces du Canada... ont exprime le desir... d'une constitution
reposant sur les m~mes principes que celle du Royaume-Uni,- la plus grande
partie de Ihistoire constitutionnelle du Canada peut 6tre interpretee comme
etant la recherche d'une identite constitutionnelle distinctivement canadienne.
Les Canadiens ont toujours considere que leurs outils constitutionnels refletent
et produisent une vision particuliere de la nation et de ses citoyens. L'article
traite de la recherche de Iidentite constitutionnelle du Canada pendant les cent
premieres annees de son existence en tant que nation, de la Confederation
jusqu'aux annees 1960. S'appuyant sur un large eventail de sources et de voix,
Iauteur de I'article avance que le fort desir d'identite a ete un moteur important
du droit constitutionnel, de la politique et de la culture au Canada, a I'epoque
qui a precede I'arrivee du catalyseur qu'a ete la Charte canadienne des droits et
libertes.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alberta, Faculty of Law. Thanks to Kim Brooks and to
the participants at the Identity in Law workshop at the Schulich School of Law for rich and rewarding
sessions from which this article emerged. Thanks also to two anonymous reviewers for very helpful
constructive criticism.
Eric M. Adams*
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Introduction
John Sanborn is not an especially well-known figure in Canadian history,
despite being the only Canadian politician elected on a platform promoting
Canada's annexation to the United States.1 Born in New Hampshire in
1819, he ventured to Canada as a young man to lead a school in Sherbrooke,
Quebec, before beginning a prosperous legal career. Elected to the
Legislative Assembly of Canada in 1850 advocating the economic benefits
of joining the United States, he was later acclaimed to the Legislative
Council, and then appointed to the Canadian Senate after Confederation.
A former political adversary, John A. Macdonald, appointed Sanborn to
the Superior Court of Quebec in 1872. A long-time political friend, A.-A.
Dorion, promoted Sanborn to the Quebec Court of Queen's Bench (later
renamed the Quebec Court of Appeal) in 1874. His sudden death in 1877
caused the Montreal Gazette to lament the loss of "a bright and shining
example of the upright lawyer, the learned and conscientious Judge, the
good citizen."2 Indeed, Sanborn lived a life suffused with law, politics,
and citizenship in the most dynamic, exciting, and tumultuous era of
constitution making in Canada's history.
Sanborn's perspective on Confederation itself was complicated. While
he supported the creation of the federal nation of Canada in principle,
he would have preferred an elected Senate, greater safeguards for the
protection of property and civil rights for the English-speaking minority
in Quebec, and a constitution-making process that more directly engaged
voters. But Sanborn's contributions to Canada's Confederation debates
stand out for another reason. Rising in the Legislative Council on 9
February 1865, Sanborn reminded his fellow politicians that to succeed,
a constitution must provide more than a legal blueprint for governance:
1. "Sanborn, John Sewell" Dictionary of Canadian Biography, online: <222.biographi.ca/en/bio.
php?id nbr-5251>.
2. "The Late Mr Justice Sanborf' Montreal Gazette (19 July 1877) 2.
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If we desired to have a constitution that would afford good hope of
permanency, it must be planted deep in the affections of the people ...
for until their intellects were convinced of its excellence, they would not
be prepared to uphold it and resist innovations. But they must feel and
comprehend the obligation .... To render it secure, it must be in the hearts
of the people.'
Sanborn spoke of the need for a Canadian constitution that could be felt as
well as comprehended, a constitution that engaged the intellect, but more
importantly stirred the heart. A constitution of the people, Sanborn argued,
found its full life as an idea, story, and identity in the thoughts and dreams
of those subject to its rule.
Today, Canada's constitution serves as an object of law for lawyers,
a set of rules for governments, and as a repository of politics for political
scientists and journalists. A constitution is, of course, all of those things,
but a constitution also consists of the stories a nation tells about itself.'
A constitution finds full meaning and expression in the multiple, diverse,
layered, and conflicting claims made about its histories, purposes, and
defining characteristics.5 Just as personal identity is forged and sustained
in a narrative of the self,6 constitutional stories are driven by the desire
to make coherent these varied strands of constitutional text, perspective,
and experience.7 Such stories serve as a living oral history, always in the
process of being made and re-made in the telling. A particular constitutional
story may be dominant or subversive, popular or obscure at any particular
moment, but regardless these stories draw from, and also give shape
3. Janet Ajzenstat et al, eds, Canada ' Founding Debates (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1999) at 231.
4. On the constitutive power of stories see J Edward Chamberlin, If This is Your Land, Where Are
Your Stories?: Finding Common Ground (Toronto: AAKnopf Canada, 2003) at 2. Stories, Chamberlin
writes, "tell people where they came from, and why they are here; how to live, and sometimes how
to die. They come in many different forms, from creation stories to constitutions, from southern epics
and northern sagas to native American tales and African praise songs, and from nursery rhymes and
national anthems to myths and mathematics. And they are all ceremonies of belief as much as they are
chronicles of events."
5. "We cannot escape from these constitutional cross-currents," Alan Cairns writes. "To accept
their coexistence as central components of our constitutional fabric is the beginning of wisdom." Alan
C Cairns, Charter versus Federalism: The Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1992) at 65.
6. "Self-identity," Anthony Giddens argues, "presumes a narrative." Anthony Giddens, Modernity
and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) at 76. See
generally, Dan P McAdams, The Stories We Live By: Personal Myths and the Making of the Self (New
York: William Morrow & Company, 1993) at 11.
7. I use the term constitutional stories to refer generally to the narratives that are devised about the
constitution and its meanings as a whole, rather than to the particular stories of specific constitutional
cases. On the latter in the American context see Michael C Doff, ed, Constitutional Law Stories (New
York: Foundation Press, 2004).
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and meaning to, the constitution itself as well as the constitutional law,
politics, and culture in which it is embedded. The creation of constitutional
meanings, in this sense, are the products not only of judges, politicians,
and civil servants, but of a broader "interpretive community" comprising
lawyers, scholars, journalists, artists, and citizens.' Not all are equally
influential, but all may play a role in telling more or less compelling
stories of constitutional significance. The stories themselves tell us much
in their content and omissions, proponents and critics, tenor and tone. In
this, Sanborn was surely right: a constitution endures in its capacity to
garner affection, in the stories it tells, in the identities it fosters.
This article argues that a great deal of constitutional law, culture,
and politics can be explained in terms of the making, contestation, and
transformation of such constitutional stories, or, as I call them here,
constitutional identities. From early struggles to define the balance
of federalism in the relationship between the provinces and federal
government, to ongoing controversies concerning the place of Quebec in
the federation, the application of individual rights and their proportionate
limits, judicial remedial discretion and deference, and aboriginal rights and
Indigenous sovereignty, Canada's constitution has been defined as much
by a struggle to determine Canada's constitutional identity as to interpret
its formal constitutional text.9 My purpose in this article is to examine one
particularly enduring strand among the battles over Canada's constitutional
identity: the search for "constitutional autochthony," or, what Peter Oliver
usefully describes as the "constitution of independence."1 The term
autochthony originates in the comparative constitutional work of Kenneth
Wheare as a way of explaining the twentieth-century desire of some
Commonwealth countries, including Canada, to constitutionally separate
from Great Britain. But Wheare intended the term to gesture to something
altogether deeper and less tangible than mere autonomy: authochthony, he
8. Cairns, supra note 5 at 63.
9. Other projects of mine have charted the role of ideas emanating from the constitutional culture as
powerful forces of constitutional change. See Eric M Adams, "Canada's 'Newer Constitutional Law'
and the Idea of Constitutional Rights" (2006) 51:3 McGill LJ 435; Eric M Adams, "Building a Law
of Human Rights: Roncarelli v. Duplessis in Canadian Constitutional Culture" (2010) 55:3 McGill LJ
437 [Adams, "Building a Law of Human Rights"]; and Eric M Adams, "Constitutional Nationalism:
Politics, Law, and Culture on the Road to Patriation" in Steve Patten & Lois Harder eds, Patriation
and its Consequences: Constitution Making in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015) 49 [Adams,
"Constitutional Nationalism"].
10. KC Wheare, The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1960) at 89; Peter Oliver, The Constitution of Independence: The Development of Constitutional
Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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observed, described the d sire for an indigenous constitutionalism "sprung
from their own soil."11
Despite the famous declaration in the Constitution Act, 1867 that the
"Provinces of Canada... Desire... a Constitution similar in Principle to
that of the United Kingdom,"12 much of Canada's constitutional history
can be understood as the search for an autochthonous and distinctly
domestic Canadian constitutional identity, one tied up with, but not limited
to, independence, a domestic amending formula, and recognition and
expression of the diverse political, social, and cultural realities of Canada.
That yearning for a uniquely Canadian constitutional identity emerged
from and textured Canada's constitutional jurisprudence, scholarship, and
culture just as it came to drive the constitutional politics of Confederation,
independence, patriation, and the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords.
This article has three parts. Part I sketches more fully what I mean
by constitutional identity, charts the forces which create those identities,
and argues that constitutional identities play a crucial role in Canadian
constitutional law, politics, and culture. Part II identifies constitutional
nationalism as an early and influential strand in the formation of Canadian
constitutional identity. As I have explained elsewhere, constitutional
nationalism "locates its demand for national self-determination, ideology,
and sovereignty in formal constitutional instruments. It takes seriously
the legal authority of the constitution to effect change but also the
symbolic role of the constitution as an instrument to construct and cement
national identity, unity, and purpose."13 Early efforts to define Canadian
constitutional distinctiveness by Thomas D'Arcy McGee, among others,
transformed into calls for constitutional autonomy from Great Britain, and,
ultimately, the search for complete constitutional independence, alongside
a distinct and indigenous expression of Canadian constitutionalism. Part
III examines arguments for a Canadian constitutional identity within the
context of the political, cultural, and constitutional debates of the 1960s.
In discussions about the new national flag, national unity, and repatriation
of the constitution, Canadians were at once unified by a desire for
constitutional self-definition, but also on the cusp of profound disagreement
about how new constitutional arrangements might best express and reflect
the nation's true nature and essential characteristics.
11. Wheare, supra note 10 at 89. Following developments in the Commonwealth over much of
the twentieth century, Wheare observed the common constitutional demand for "self-sufficiency, of
constitutional autarky .. of being constitutionally rooted in their own native soil."
12. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91, reprinted inRSC 1985, Appendix 11, No 5,
Preamble.
13. Adams, "Constitutional Nationalism," supra note 9 at 49-50.
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I. Constituting identities
Constitutional law scholars have been inclined to downplay or ignore
the force and utility of an abstract and elusive concept like constitutional
identity in favour of the firmer stuff of positive law. But defining the
provisions of Canada's constitution has proven a notoriously slippery
exercise. Even the constitution itself shies away from the task. Section
52(2) stipulates the formal instruments included in the "supreme law
of Canada," but leaves open the possibility that other elements might
also have constitutional status.14 And, of course, in its preamble, the
Constitution Act, 1867 declared that Canada's constitution would be
"similar in Principle" to the essentially unwritten constitution "of the
United Kingdom."15 The Supreme Court of Canada famously peered into
the constitution's open-ended self-definition in the Secession Reference
to discover a series of unwritten constitutional principles-"supporting
principles and rules, which include constitutional conventions and the
workings of Parliament"-which "inform and sustain the constitutional
text."16 Especially of late the Supreme Court has emphasized the
normative force of the constitution's "internal architecture," the unwritten
structural features that span and connect its written terms.17 Elements of
that architecture, like unwritten constitutional principles more broadly,
the Court counsels "must inform our interpretation, understanding, and
application of the text."1" The amorphous constitutional swirl of text,
unwritten principles, and internal architecture makes definitive statements
on the constitution's precise content difficult, if not impossible. "After 136
14. The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 52(2)
provides that "The Constitution of Canada includes" the Canada Act 1982, Acts and orders listed
in the schedule, and amendments to those included constitutional instruments. "Section 52 does not
provide an exhaustive definition of the content of the Constitution of Canada": Reference re Senate
Reform, 2014 SCC 32 at para 24, [2014] 1 SCR 704.
15. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 12.
16. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at paras 32, 49, 161 DLR (4th) 385
[Secession Reference].
17. Reference re Senate Reform, supra note 14 at para 26: "[T]he Constitution," the majority writes,
"must be interpreted with a view to discerning the structure of government that it seeks to implement.
The assumptions that underlie the text and the manner in which the constitutional provisions are
intended to interact with one another." See also Reference re Supreme CourtAct, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC
21 at para 100, [2014] 1 SCR 433 holding that the Supreme Court of Canada formed "an essential part
of Canada's constitutional architecture"; and Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British
Columbia (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 59 at para 27, 375 DLR (4th) 599 holding that in determining
the scope of constitutional heads of power "the Court must consider not only the written words of that
provision, but how a particular interpretation fits with other constitutional powers and the assumptions
that underlie the text." But see British Columbia v Imperial Tobacco Canada, 2005 SCC 49 at para
67, [2005] 2 SCR 473 reminding that "[t]he rule of law is not an invitation to trivialize or supplant the
Constitution's written terms."
18. Reference re Senate Reform, supra note 14 at para 26.
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years as a sophisticated nation supposedly devoted to constitutionalism
and the rule of law," Harry Arthurs complains, "we still do not know what
the Canadian constitution actually is."19
Yet it is difficult to imagine how it might be otherwise, and not only
because, in Lord Sankey's famous metaphor, the constitution "planted in
Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural
limits."2 A constitution structures the organs of government, creates
legal rights and obligations, and embodies a set of ideals and aspirations
of governance, but it is not self-executing. Constitutions ultimately
rely on the arguments of lawyers, interpretations of courts, observance
of governments, and the imaginations of citizens. There will always be
uncertainty in the interpretation and application of abstract constitutional
provisions to concrete and ever-changing social realities. So too with
the judicial attachment to constitutional precedents which often bends,
shifts, and breaks in the gears of time.21 There is "no still point," R.C.B.
Risk reminds us, in the dynamic meaning of constitutional principles.22
A constitution is better envisaged not as an object of defined and rigid
borders, but rather as a fluid and never-ending process of relations worked
and re-worked over time. A constitutionalism of context, process, and
relationships is one in which conceptions and contestations of identity take
on greater importance in establishing the normative frameworks by which
the disparate features of the constitution cohere.
As Hanna Pitkin also reminds us, "constitutions are made, not found.23
The Canadian constitution, like the foundational documents of other
nations, is the product of human creation, compromise, and context, as well
as relationships between and across levels and branches of government,
civil society and the state. Despite our attention to the constitutional texts
enacted at and after Confederation, Canada's constitution originated
19. Harry Arthurs, "Constitutional Courage" (2004) 49:1 McGill LJ 1 at 7 [emphasis in original].
20. Edwards v Canada (AG), [1930] AC 124 at 136, [1929] All ER Rep 571 [Edwards].
21. The Supreme Court has shown a recent willingness to revise, overturn, or side-step precedent in a
number of constitutional cases. "fS]tare decisis is not a straightjacket that condemns the law to stasis."
Precedent may be revisited, the Court explained, where there have been "significant developments
in the law, or if there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the
parameters of the debate." Carter v Canada, 2015 SCC 5 at para 44; Canada v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72
at para 42, [2013] 3 SCR 1101; Saskatchewan Federation ofLabour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4 at
para 32. See generally Eric M Adams, "Twice Upon a Time: Re-litigating the Charter" [unpublished
manuscript].
22. RCB Risk, "Blake and Liberty" in RCB Risk, A History of Canadian Legal Thought: Collected
Essays, ed by G Blaine Baker & Jim Phillips (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for The Osgoode
Society for Canadian Legal History, 2006) 130 at 146.
23. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, "The Idea of a Constitution" (1987) 37:2 J Legal Educ 167 at 168
[emphasis in original].
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in Indigenous legalities and were forged in relations, and then treaties,
between newcomers and Indigenous peoples.24 Canada's turn to written
constitutionalism during the "empire of writing" of the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, produced formal constitutions but ones still reliant on
a host of unstated political, cultural, and linguistic assumptions, context,
and meanings." And, like the constitutional treaties before them, Canada's
constitutional instruments formalized and made normative relationships
within government and between government and civil society. The result
is a constitution that, like the background assumptions and relationships
upon which it is based, can shift and transform over time; a constitution
that perpetually exists in a state of becoming.
The "children of two logics" is how Benjamin Berger describes
the Canadian constitution's inevitable textual and philosophic tensions
which emerge from the compromises inherent in its creation, and ongoing
negotiation crucial to its survival. For Berger, Canada's constitution is
defined by two poles: "that of the local, the particular, and of harmonious
relations between diverse communities through political compromise;
and that of the metaphysical, the universal, and of a faith in the reason of
legal principle."26 But as Canadian judges quickly discovered in very real
and practical ways, the Constitution Act, 1867 presented a broad series of
competing logics and tensions in the formal text beyond the local versus
the universal: "exclusive" heads of jurisdictional power that nonetheless
substantially overlapped; a constitution "similar in Principle to that of
the United Kingdom,"2 but fundamentally American-inspired in its
approach to a written division of federal and provincial powers; a nation
simultaneously created by, and divided into, sub-national provinces with
amorphous constitutional roles, among a host of other uncertainties about
the meaning of words, phrases, and concepts. Indeed, there may have been
considerable wisdom in doing so; eschewing precise prescriptions allowed
a diversity of views and political orientations to plausibly fit within its
terms. Hence both John A. Macdonald's centralized vision of federalism
and Oliver Mowat's interpretation of decentralized provincial rights
24. John Borrows, Canada's Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010);
Mark D Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in Law and History
after Marshalf" (2001) 24:2 Dal LJ 75.
25. Linda Colley, "Empires of Writing: Britain, America and Constitutions, 1776-1848" (2014) 32:2
LHR 237.
26. Benjamin L Berger, "Children of Two Logics: A Way Into Canadian Constitutional Culture"
(2013) 11:2 Intl J Constitutional L 319 at 321-322.
27. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 12, Preamble, ss 91-92.
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both could find resonance in the constitution as drafted."8 Janet Ajzenstat
goes further in arguing that failure to entrench clear substantive goals or
a "single idea of Canada" was intentionally premised on the principles
of parliamentary democracy, the idea that a flexible constitution enabled
rather than constrained the policy choices of political parties of differing
persuasions." Whatever the origins-intended purpose, product of
compromise, or creature of happenstance-the Constitution Act, 1867 and
its flexible and uncertain mix of cross-currents has proven a remarkably
durable framework of governance.
The Constitution Act, 1982 offers similar provisions of dissonance.
Its preamble announces that Canada "is founded upon principles that
recognize the supremacy of God" while section 2 secures the freedom
to believe or not believe in the divine. It entrenches equality rights for
,every individual" while elsewhere proposing differential treatment for
"citizens," certain linguistic minorities, and the "aboriginal peoples of
Canada." The section of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
which "guarantees" rights and freedoms also subjects them to "reasonable
limits," while select rights can be overridden entirely.3" In confronting such
dilemmas of constitutional coherence, here, again, Pitkin is instructive.
"[T]o understand what a constitution is," she writes, "one must look not
for some crystalline core or essence of unambiguous meaning but precisely
at the ambiguities, the specific oppositions that this specific concept helps
us to hold in tension."31 In other words, in navigating fissures of logic
and ambiguity, judges, lawyers, governments, and civil society turn to
and construct a deeper set of constitutional meanings and values in order
to make sense of an instrument of abstraction that matters deeply to a
collective sense of legality, justice, and nationhood. In doing so, they craft
and sustain constitutional identities.
Add constitutional theory, then, to the long list of disciplines across
the social sciences and humanities engaging in questions of why and how
identities are formed (and reformed), and why and how they function.
28. The battle to uncover the historical essence of Canada's federal arrangements continues. Contrast
John T Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press for The Osgoode Society for CanadianLegal History, 2002) [Saywell, The
Lawmakers] with Paul Romney, Getting it Wrong: How Canadians Forgot Their Past and Imperilled
Confederation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
29. Janet Ajzenstat, Discovering Confederation: A Canadian ' Story (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 2014) at 4; Janet Ajzenstat, The Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parliament
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007).
30. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, ss Preamble, 1, 2, 3, 6, 15, 23, 25, 33.
31. Pitkin, supra note 23 at 167.
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"There are no ceremonies more important to the imagining of individual
and collective identity," literary scholar J. Edward Chamberlin writes,
"than our contracts with each other."32 In the influential philosophical
work of Charles Taylor, identities emerge from deep dialogue with a
dynamic environment of others. "We define our identity," Taylor writes,
"always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our
significant others want to see in us."33 Rather than preordained, identities
take shape and find expression in everyday moments of human contact:
nurture, kindness, love; misunderstanding, animosity, defiance. We can
see a very similar social and relational dynamic at work in the formation
of constitutional identities. "[A] constitution," Gary Jacobsohn explains
"acquires an identity through experience," a "dialogical" process in which
the "disharmonies of constitutional law and politics" create the space and
drive the need for competing claims about the constitution's true nature .3
The origins of constitutional identity in experience calls to mind
Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous aphorism that "[t]he life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience.135 In the less well-known sentences
that follow, Holmes elaborates,
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have a good deal more to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what
it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.
36
32. Chamberlin, supra note 4 at 226.
33. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in Amy Gutmann, ed, Multiculturalism:
Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) 25 at 32-
33; Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
See also Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2005); Richard Ned Lebow, The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012).
34. Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2010) at 4, 7. Michel Rosenfeld helpfully reminds that "Constitutions and constitutionalism only make
sense under conditions of pluralism. A purely homogenous society ... would not require a constitution."
According to Rosenfeld, "democracies ... revolve around a multiplicity of identities and differences in
constant dynamic interaction resulting in a diverse array of selves ... demarcated through a constant
process of inclusion and exclusion" Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject:
Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and Community (London: Routledge, 2009) at 21.
35. OW Holmes Jr, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co, 1881) at 1.
36. Ibid. See generally, Brian Hawkins, "The Life of the Law: What Holmes Meant" (2011-2012)
33:2 Whittier L Rev 323.
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In similar fashion, constitutional identity is created by a plurality of
contextual experience, blending political theory, narratives of the past,
and aspirations for the future. When this deeper constitutional identity
resonates with and finds acceptance in the broader constitutional culture,
it shapes the interpretation of substantive constitutional law, channels
and frames constitutional politics, and, in some instances, operates as a
shadow constitution cast off at an angle from the formal one. At times, a
constitutional identity can even become dominant enough to challenge the
legality-de facto or de jure-of the constitution itself.
Constitutional identities draw principally from the constitution's
formal provisions, but not exclusively so. They rely too on historical
understandings, national agendas and dilemmas, and a multiplicity
of dreams, demands, hopes, and wishes. They may overlap with and
encompass a broader series of national identities, but they are not
synonymous with images of the nation in the strict sense.3 While national
identities speak broadly to the "imagined communities" of the nation-state
and its peoples,38 constitutional identities are more narrowly attached to
the constitution, its modes of organizing, logics of legality, rule of law
symbolism, and instrumental purpose in creating and limiting the state
and mediating relations within it. Constitutional identities are malleable,
sometimes tendentious, constructs capable of disagreement and contest, as
well as shifts and change overtime. Constitutional identities give shape and
meaning to the formal constitution by providing a guide to constitutional
interpretation. In these respects, constitutional identities are employed to
resolve a constitution's tensions, ambiguities, and disagreements; select
its unwritten principles; determine the expanse of its internal architecture;
bend the arc of its interpretation; inform the content and force of its
conventions; and set the intensity of the demands to amend its provisions.
Judges play an important role in the process of shaping a constitution's
identities and the interpretive and substantive consequences that flow
from them, but they are not alone in their influence. The constitution is a
legal instrument with a broad political and cultural life in civil society. A
constitution finds meaning in more than the black letters of cases, but also
in media representations ofjudicial decisions and constitutional provisions,
politics in its broadest sense, popular media, literature, art, and film.39
Within this broader sphere of constitutional culture, constitutional identity
37. Rosenfeld, supra note 34 at 12.
38. BenedictAnderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism,
2nd ed (London: Verso, 1991).
39. Benjamin Authers, A Culture of Rights: Law, Literature, and Nation (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, forthcoming).
322 The Dalhousie Law Journal
takes shape. Naturally enough this multiplicity ofperspectives can and does
produce conflict over the constitution's true identity. Such disagreements
are inevitable, indeed are themselves productive of the ongoing formation
of constitutional identities. Somewhat ironically, the search for a defining
constitutional identity often proceeds on the understanding that there is
a defined singular essence of the constitution. And yet, the process of
constitutional identity-making, and its history over time, reveals just the
opposite: that a constitution and its contested identities exist in a dynamic
state of transition and pluralism. Some identities have a stronger and more
enduring purchase on the constitutional imagination than others, but all
are subject to changes in the political, legal, and cultural forces which
gave rise to those identities in the first place. Charting moments when
a particular identity or set of identities held sway, were swept aside, or
rose to challenge existing or partial constitutional understandings ives
access to a richer and more complete view of the history of Canadian
constitutionalism.
Where there is constitutionalism, there will be competing conceptions
of constitutional identity. In Canada, conflicting identities explain how
a formal constitution with a strongly (but not uniformly) centralizing
division of powers came to support a highly decentralized federation. So
it was that by the 1930s, given the decentralist jurisprudence crafted by
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and in light of a half century
of political maturation among provincial governments, Justice Cannon
could confidently declare that "[u]niformity is not in the spirit of our
constitution," but rather that "[d]iversity is the basis of our constitution."4
"Federalism was a legal response to the underlying political and cultural
realities that existed at Confederation and continue to exist today," the
Supreme Court agreed in recognizing federalism as one of the unwritten
principles of the Canadian constitution." A constitution's written terms, in
other words, will only tell you so much about how a constitution actually
operates, about what  constitution actually means. Which is not to deny
the power of constitutional text to define and proscribe constitutional
outcomes, so much as a recognition that in the fissures, gaps, ambiguities,
and abstract language of constitutional law, constitutional identities often
serve as powerful interpretive guides. Throughout Canada's constitutional
past, an identity of constitutional nationalism-the desire for autonomous
control and independence in formal constitutional terms, but also the
need to see the nation reflected and embodied in its constitutional spirit-
40. Canada (AG) v Ontario (AG), [1936] SCR 461 at 521, [1936] 3 DLR 673 [Labour Conventions].
41. Secession Reference, supra note 16 at para 43.
Canadian Constitutional Identities
exerted a powerful influence on constitutional law, politics, and culture.
The force of the search to find Canada in the constitution propelled
Canadians on the path of constitutional renewal, disagreement, and, in
some cases, disenchantment.
II. Canadian constitutional nationalism
The search for a distinctive Canadian constitutional identity began before
the nation of Canada existed and has continued after the Constitution
Act, 1982 purported to settle the matter. Transplanted law is always
transformed in the process of migration by the imperatives of local
custom and circumstance, and, in the case of Canada, by the existing legal
frameworks of Indigenous peoples.42 Eighteenth-century constitutional
law in North America-first in treaties and then in instruments such as the
Royal Proclamation of 1763-often reflected the realities of respecting
Indigenous peoples and their laws.43 Equally, the unique circumstances
posed by the French fact led to the pluralism, partial and hesitant before
fully accepted and embraced, reflected in the ConstitutionalAct of] 79]44
and the Quebec Act of 1 774.45 In the century which followed, in what
is now Western Canada, it was a dynamic blend of the English common
law, Hudson's Bay Company law, Cree law, and Mdtis law that regulated
the fur trade, governed private relations, and dispensed criminal justice.46
Perhaps most significantly, the push for and achievement of responsible
government in the colonies in the mid-nineteenth century represented
the ideal of local independence in constitutional governance. As
Robert Baldwin Sullivan enthused in 1844, "When Canadians obtained
Responsible Government, they got the life and soul of the constitution
with it."47 But if the constitution's soul rested in Canada, much of the
inspiration for its machinery still remained tied to British antecedents.
42. Borrows, supra note 24.
43. For the history of one often overlooked constitutional instrument i  the era before Confederation
see Eric M Adams, "Ghosts in Court: Jonathan Belcher and the Proclamation of 1762" (2004) 27:2 Dal
LJ 321.
44. (UK), 31 Geo III, c 31.
45. (UK), 14 Geo III, c 83.
46. John McLaren, Hamar Foster & Chet Orloff, eds, Law for the Elephant, Law for the Beaver:
Essays in the Legal History of the North American West (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre,
1992); H Robert Baker, "Creating Order in the Wilderness: Transplanting the English Law to Rupert's
Land, 1835-51" (1999) 17:2 LHR 209; Sarah Carter, The Importance of Being Monogamous:
Marriage and Nation Building in Western Canada to 1915 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press,
2008).
47. Michael S Cross,A Biography ofRobert Baldwin: The Morning-Star ofMemory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012) at 85. See generally, Benjamin T Jones, Republicanism and Responsible
Government: The Shaping of Democracy in Australia and Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 2014).
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Debates surrounding Confederation revealed just how strongly the
British constitutional ideal remained in the Canadian legal and political
imagination. Although the constitution-making process revealed a
complicated tapestry of ideas blending American and British constitutional
models with existing constitutional practices and traditions in the uniting
colonies, including Lower Canada's civilian legal system, an especially
dominant theme in the confederation debates was the necessity of retaining
an identity of constitutional Britishness, especially among the Anglophone
framers. John A. Macdonald spoke frequently of the founding of "a great
Kingdom, in connection with the British monarchy and under the British
flag."48 But many others too emphasized the desire for a new united
Canada to retain its connection-legal, political, military, economic,
cultural, and psychological-to Great Britain. In the Nova Scotia House
of Assembly on 10 April 1865, Charles Tupper declaimed with confidence
that, "the desire of every British American is to remain in connection
with the people of Great Britain. If there is any sentiment that was ever
strong in the breast of our people, it is a disinclination to be separated in
any way whatever from the British Empire."49 Of course, Tupper glossed
over many points of difference among Canadian politicians, let alone the
Canadian public. To be sure, the intensity of the desire to maintain the
connection to Britain, and the underlying reasons for it, varied sharply.
Nonetheless, the centrality of the British constitutional connection found
expression in countless ways in the Constitution Act, 1867, including the
declaration of emulation of British constitutionalism and the centrality of
"the Interests of the British Empire" in the preamble, but also, and perhaps
more pointedly, in the absence of a domestic amending formula, and the
extensive, powerful, and enduring presence of the Crown in the balance
of the instrument."
Canada's constitutional connection to Britain extended beyond the
strictures of the constitutional text into broader claims championed by
groups like the Orange Order about the essential Britishness of Canadian
constitutional culture. In the late nineteenth century, the Imperial Federation
League (later the British Empire League) also emerged as centres of
48. Donald Creighton, John A Macdonald: The Young Politician (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1998) at 458.
49. Ajzenstat et al, supra note 3 at 170.
50. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 12. Take, for example, section 9 which provides: "The
Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is hereby declared to continue and be vested
in the Queen."
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intense and impassioned "British Canadian patriotism."' 1 As Carl Berger
explains, "in French Canada [the League's] progress was viewed firstly
with indifference, then alarm, and finally with massive hostility."52 In
Quebec, some observers began to note that the ascendancy of an identity
of constitutional Britishness had ramifications beyond the formal workings
of parliamentary government and might more broadly influence ethnic,
religious, and linguistic conceptions of citizenship, belonging, and nation,
as well as relations between the federal government and Quebec. Canada's
decision to join Great Britain in the Boer War proved a decisive moment
in the emerging fault lines between imperialists and many in francophone
Quebec. Henri Bourassa, in particular, gave voice to a growing movement
in what would become the Ligue Nationaliste which decried Canada's
colonial status and British imposition on Canadian domestic affairs. "In
vain do our Canadian imperialists proclaim that we have attained the
status of a nation," Bourassa argued. "[T]he fact is that we have never
yet exercised one of the essential prerogatives of national sovereignty:
...the conduct of and the control over our foreign relations."53 In English
Canada too, voices emerged in constitutional law and politics challenging
the constitutional status quo and asserting the presence and authority of a
latent but visceral Canadian constitutional identity of independence. It did
not take long for the veneer of Tupper's confident claims at Confederation
to wear thin, exposing a more complicated set of constitutional identities
within the Canadian polity.
In reality such threads had always been present. The politician and
writer, Thomas D'Arcy McGee, had championed and given eloquent
expression to the concept of a "new northern nationality"-a common
phrase in the period, "but which McGee made his own"-in the decade
leading to Confederation.54 Although George-ttienne Cartier spoke more
cautiously of a "political nationality" that permitted, even celebrated, a
diversity of peoples, the language and status of nationhood was everywhere
apparent.55 For McGee, that nationality was always to be intimately bound
51. Carl Berger, ed, Imperialism and Nationalism, 1884 1914: A Conflict in Canadian Thought
(Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969) at 2 [Berger, Imperialism and Nationalism]. See also Carl Berger, The
Sense ofPower: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1970).
52. Berger, Imperialism and Nationalism, supra note 51.
53. Henri Bourassa, Great Britain and Canada: Topics of the Day (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1902) at
4. See generally Real Belanger, Henri Bourassa: Lejascinant destin d'un homme libre (1868 1914)
(Laval: Presses de l'Universite Laval, 2013) at 98-100.
54. David A Wilson, Thomas D 'Arcy McGee, Volume 2: The Extreme Moderate, 185 1868
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011) at 22, 39.
55. Ajzenstat et al, supra note 3 at 230.
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up in its constitutional arrangements, the federalism of its constitution,
and, in particular, the protection of minority religious education rights.
In his last speech in Parliament before his assassination in 1868, McGee
predicted that
[tlime will show us the Constitution of this Dominion as much
cherished in the hearts of the people of all its Provinces... as is the
British Constitution itself... I have faith in the Confederation for another
reason...I believe that it is the design of Providence that here shall be
established on the northern portion of this continent, a nationality and
system of government different from that other nationality existing to
the south of us."
McGee prophesied, he claimed, "not as the representative of any race, or
of any Province, but as thoroughly and emphatically a Canadian."57 At his
funeral one week later, "some eighty thousand people thronged the streets
of Montreal" to pay their respects to the man considered Confederation's
poet.58
McGee's ideas lived. On 1 July 1867, the Globe hailed "this birthday
of a new nationality. A united British America... takes its place among
the nations of the world."59 Canadian nationalism took many forms in
the decades that followed, but one variant followed McGee's insistence
on the connection between a distinctive nationality and the constitution.
What I am calling constitutional nationalism focused on the constitution as
instantiating, in both symbolic and practical terms, Canada's fundamental
identity.60 Because of the constitutional ambiguities discussed above,
there was nothing preordained in the constitutional identities or distinct
nationalisms different individuals and groups could draw from Canada's
constitutional instruments. Indeed, deciphering the true meaning of
Confederation and the Constitution Act, 1867-was it a compact among
provinces, a bargain of two founding peoples, the imperial or domestic
creation of a single nation?-preoccupied a good deal of twentieth-
century Canadian constitutional thought and politics. The Commissioners
of Quebec's Tremblay Commission viewed Confederation as "a pact of
56. House of Commons Debates, 1st Par, 1st Sess, No 1 (6 April 1868) at 470-471 (Hon Thomas
D'Arcy McGee), online: <https://archive.org/stream/cihm 38998#page/n3/mode/2up>.
57. Ibid.
58. Wilson, supra note 54 at 386.
59. Peter B Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864 1867: Politics, Newspapers and the
Union ofBritish North America, 3rd ed (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2001) at 322.
60. Adams, "Constitutional Nationalism," supra note 9.
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honour between the two great races which founded it"1 Historian and
constitutional scholar, Arthur Lower and his coauthors, on behalf of the
Native Sons of Canada, saw it differently. "The purpose of Confederation,"
they argued "was to establish a national unit, and... to obliterate the
provincial boundaries and fuse the colonial units then existing.
62 Uniting
even the wide gulf of understanding that lay between these opposing
views, was the idea that the constitution carried a particular meaning and a
capacity to shape and define the identity of the nation and its peoples. More
than that, such differing conceptions of the constitution also increasingly
agreed that Canada's constitutional identity was the singular product of its
own constitutional principles and experience, even as they differed about
what those values and realities were and what lessons should be drawn
from them.
In the early twentieth century, lawyer and writer J.S. Ewart emerged
as the most vocal, insistent, and persistent of Canada's constitutional
nationalists. Emphasizingthe strength of Canada's "feelings," "aspirations,"
and "strivings," Ewart reminded that "[tlhe founders of our federation...
desired that Canada should be a 'nation'. They wished to be 'subjects of
a great British-American nation,' styled 'The Kingdom of Canada[.]'...
[I]s that not what we still desire, and that which we must still diligently seek
after? '63 For Ewart, Canada's true constitutional intentions of distinctive
independence had been hijacked by several of its on-going constitutional
practices: Canada's British-controlled foreign policy, the legal supervision
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the absent amending
formula in Canada's constitutional documents. What Canada required
was constitutional change to align with its initial constitutional vision, its
animating constitutional identity. Typically dismissed as something of a
constitutional eccentric, if not heretic, in the early years of his campaign
for Canadian constitutional independence, Ewart's constitutional views
slowly became orthodoxy over the course of the first two decades of the
twentieth century as various of the strings binding Canada to Great Britain
began to loosen, and eventually come undone altogether.
61. Quebec, Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, Report, vol 1 (Quebec:
Province of Quebec, 1956) at v. The battle, of course, over the meaning of Confederation is ongoing.
See Cara Des Granges, "Finding Legitimacy: Examining Quebec Sovereignty from Pre-Confederation
to Present" (2014) 50 Intl J Can Studies 25.
62. Native Sons of Canada, Brief Submitted to Royal Commission on Dominion-ProvincialRelations
(Winnipeg: Albion Press, 1937) at 7.
63. John S Ewart, The Kingdom of Canada: Imperial Federation, The Colonial Conferences, The
Alaska Boundary and Other Essays (Toronto: Morang & Co, 1908) at 1, 3.
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As constitutional thinkers, McGee, Bourassa, and Ewart are significant
for the particular and emphatic manner in which they tied Canada's
national identity to its constitutional structures, laws, and conventions. In
their massive output of writings, and more generally in their careers as
prolific writers and speech makers, they framed the subject of the Canadian
constitution not as a matter of formal provisions and legal doctrine, but
rather as the repository ofan identity that could be shaped and bent for higher
purposes.64 In these respects, they are usefully contrasted with Canada's
leading constitutional scholar of the period, A.H.F. Lefroy. Lefroy's
influential treatise on Canadian constitutional law, The Law ofLegislative
Power in Canada offered a principled synthesis of legal principles dealing
with the division of powers modeled on the methodologies of legal
science, and steeped in a veneration of British constitutionalism.65 And
although it was Lefroy's work that lawyers and judges turned to when
faced with a constitutional dilemma of a legal nature, it was the spirit of
McGee's, Bourassa's and Ewart's conception of constitutional identity of
distinctive independence that became increasingly reflected in political,
jurisprudential, and cultural constitutional developments.
Throughout the 1920s, the precise nature of Canada's constitutional
status was a frequent topic of debate in the House of Commons. Canada's
international commitments and the question of national evolution within
the British Commonwealth ensured the frequent revisiting of Canada's
status as an independent nation. Canada's wartime service during the First
World War and increasing autonomy over international affairs led to its
symbolically significant signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 as an
independent nation rather than a member of the British Commonwealth.
In 1926 the Balfour Declaration further recognized Canada and several
other Dominions as "autonomous Communities within the British Empire,
equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of
their domestic or external affairs.166 The Statute of Westminster, 193161
confirmed that autonomy in legal terms, with the exception of Canada's
64. See Peter Price, "Fashioning a Constitutional Narrative: John S. Ewart and the Development of
a 'Canadian Constitution"' (2012) 93:3 Can Historical Rev 359; Sylvie Lacombe, La rencontre de
deuxpeuples elus: Comparaison des ambitions nationale et imperiale au Canada entre 1896 et 1920
(Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 2002).
65. AHF Lefroy, The Law of Legislative Power in Canada (Toronto: Toronto Law Book and
Publishing Company, 1897). See RCB Risk, "A.H.F. Lefroy: Common Law Thought in Late
Nineteenth-Century Canada: On Burying One's Grandfather" (1991) 41:3 UTLJ 307.
66. Report ofInter-ImperialRelations Committee (25 October 1926), reprinted in Maurice Ollivier,
ed, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1937, vol 3, part 2 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1954), 145 at 146.
67. Statute of Westminster, 1931 (UK), 22 & 23 Geo V, c 4, s 4, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix 11.
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constitutional documents which would remain under British jurnsdictional
authority since Canadian federal and provincial governments had not
been able to agree on a domestic constitutional amending formula. Both
Bourassa and Ewart had influence in the period's politics of constitutional
independence, Bourassa as an independent member of Parliament and
Ewart, behind the scenes, cajoling parliamentarians and providing
(solicited and unsolicited) constitutional advice to his friend, William
Lyon Mackenzie King.68 The resulting constitutional debates about
Canada's independence more typically sounded in the register of the
spirit, purpose, and identity of the constitution rather than in the formal
key of constitutional law. Bourassa, for one, while pleased by the progress,
remained unsatisfied by the advancements of the Balfour Declaration.
In criticizing the advancements as insufficient he sought to resurrect an
older constitutional spirit set in motion by the framers of Confederation,
he claimed, one committed to complete constitutional autonomy and
severance from British constitutional control. "The evolution [towards
constitutional independence] which is the natural and inevitable outcome
of the principle of self-government," Bourassa argued "was anticipated at
the time of confederation not by the radicals and not by the Liberals who
opposed confederation, but by the very founders of that confederation."69
Bourassa's turn to constitutional history-a forgotten history no less-
would emerge as a recurring theme and crucial argumentative lever in
the quest for Canada's constitutional identity."0 Driven by the politics of
the present, giving purpose to Canada's constitutional identity invariably
involved framing (and reframing) Canada's constitutional past.
For others, it was a different set of political objectives which provided
the impetus for constitutional change. J.S. Woodsworth, leader of the Co-
operative Commonwealth Federation, drove at the same constitutional
outcome of independence as Bourassa but for a different constellation
of reasons. For Woodsworth and the CCF, Canada needed a domestic
constitutional amending formula so that the constitution could be
amended to better align its nineteenth-century terms with the deeper social
68. Price, supra note 64 at 367.
69. House of Commons Debates, 16th Part, 1st Sess, No 2 (29 March 1927) at 1675 (Hon Henri
Bourassa).
70. As Anthony Brundage and Richard A Cosgrove write, "What is central to [national identity]
debates is the consensual verdict that history plays the ultimate arbiter. Whether that history is
nostalgic, romantic, antiquarian, scientific, elitist, or popular, the past, often imagined or invented, has
defined the boundaries for understanding national identity issues." Anthony Brundage & Richard A
Cosgrove, The Great Tradition: Constitutional History and National Identity in Britain and the United
States, 1870-1960 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) at 7.
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democratic norms of the twentieth-century welfare state."1 Here too, the
constitution emerged as bifurcated-a formal document out of step with its
own underlying meaning. The division raised the subtle prospect that the
formal constitution may be unconstitutional, not in any strict legal sense,
but rather as contrary to a constitutional identity. "[C]onstitutions are
made for people; not people for constitutions," Joseph Shaw, a progressive
independent, argued in the House of Commons. "Constitutions must be
just and must be interpreted not to bind and shackle the people, but to meet
the changing conditions of the times.
7 2
By the end of the Second World War, the changes that mattered
included Canada's sacrifices in war. "[W]ho governs here?" demanded
Ligouri Lacombe, an Independent MP. "Is it London or is it Ottawa?
What a shame for a country that has shed its best blood and shaken its
economic structure for the sake of the United Nations victory to apply
to the British parliament because we lack the power to amend our own
constitution! How disgraceful and humiliating for a nation!" "We shall
not be our true selves," Lacombe declared, "until we abolish appeals to
the Privy Council, until we can amend our constitution without currying
favour from anyone and until we can hoist a truly distinctive flag." 3 In
a final flourish, Lacombe raised the idea that perhaps Canada existed as a
nation "without a constitution, since our constitution does not belong to
us. It cannot be called ours." "Let us free our Canadian constitution from
all parasitic influences.74 The strangeness of this imagery, of an unreal
constitution, or, at the very least a trapped or infected one, emerged from
an effort to make sense of an identity of autonomy and distinctiveness
in the face of formal provisions which dictated otherwise. The potential
for disjuncture between a constitutional instrument and its constitutional
identity would fuel much of the patriation politics to come.
Initially resistant, courts became increasingly sensitive to the
rumblings of Canadian constitutional nationalism in constitutional politics
and culture. While the "Persons Case" has secured canonical status for its
cultivation of the "living tree" metaphor of constitutional interpretation,
the case has been largely overlooked as an early expression of Canada's
71. See Adams, "Constitutional Nationalism," supra note 9.
72. House of Commons Debates, 14th Pan, 3rd Sess, No 1 (20 March 1924) at 530-531 (Hon Joseph
Shaw).
73. House ofCommons Debates, 20thParl, 2nd Sess, No 2 (6 June 1946) at 2257-2258 (HonLigouri
Lacombe).
74. Ibid at 2259.
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drive for constitutional independence." Before he planted his metaphorical
tree, Lord Sankey tilled the figurative soil. Turning to "the special history"
of the Canadian constitution, Lord Sankey makes plain that it is the
particular constitutional history of Canada and its peoples that provide
the necessary context of constitutional interpretation, not the numerous
foreign judgments relied on by the Supreme Court of Canada and stressed
in argument by counsel. Despite drawing on bigoted evolutionary thinking
about the "Britannic system['s] embrace [of] countries and peoples
in every stage of social, political and economic development," Lord
Sankey concluded that the legal cultures of place mattered and required
judicial deference and respect (at least insofar as Canada was concerned).
"[T]his Board must take great care," he noted, "not to interpret legislation
meant to apply to one community by a rigid adherence to the customs and
traditions of another."6 Thus Lord Sankey envisaged a living tree "planted
in Canada" in order to "grant a Constitution to Canada."7 And to make his
meaning plainer still, he explained as follows:
Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board.. .to cut
down the provisions of the Act by a narrow and technical construction,
but rather to give it a large and liberal interpretation so that the Dominion
to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, may be mistress in her
own house, as the Provinces to a great extent, but within certain fixed
limits, are mistresses in theirs.78
The living tree metaphor has been largely embraced as an approach to
liberal and progressive constitutional interpretation, but in its own time
and context, set against the backdrop of the Balfour Declaration, the
politics of independence, and on the eve of the passage of the Statute of
Westminster, 1931, the living tree was an expression and confirmation of
Canada's constitutional distinctiveness and independence.
Contemplating the end of Privy Council appeals in criminal matters
a few years later, the Privy Council similarly determined that "[s]uch
appeals seem to be essentially matters of Canadian concern and... a prime
element in Canadian sovereignty as appertaining to matters of justice.1
79
75. Edwards, supra note 20. See generally Robert J Sharpe & Patricia I McMahon, The Persons
Case: The Origins and Legacy of the Fight for Legal Personhood (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press for The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2007); Saywell, The Lawmakers, supra
note 28 at 191-192.
76. Edwards, supra note 20 at 135.
77. Ibid at 136 [emphasis added].
78. Ibid.
79. British Coal Corp v R, [1935] AC 500, [1935] All ER Rep 139. Contrast the Privy Council's
much different tone inNadan vR, [1926] AC 482, 95 LJPC 114.
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For the Privy Council, the constitutional evolution that mattered had
already taken place: Canada's constitutional maturity to independent and
autonomous status created new realities to which the constitution itself
must now conform.
The irony of the distant Privy Council pronouncing on the nature of
Canadian constitutional autonomy was not lost on the increasing number
of lawyers and politicians from English Canada still calling for the end
of Privy Council appeals."0 Constitutional scholar Frank Scott among
others had long noted that "the interpretation of the Constitution is a
matter that cannot be left to judges who are unfamiliar with Canadian
traditions and with the Canadian situation.""l Here again Scott signalled
the disjunction of the formal constitution from another set of constitutional
values and norms born of "Canadian traditions" and circumstances. While
many constitutional observers in francophone Quebec, and other staunch
proponents of provincial rights, continued to worry that the loss ofthe Privy
Council as a final court of appeal would erode the judicial protections for
provincial jurisdiction and autonomy,2 the fate of British legal oversight
had been sealed as fundamentally out of step with Canada's constitutional
identity of independence. Significantly, when the Tremblay Commission
criticized the federalism jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada
in the 1950s, the proposed solution was not a return to Privy Council
oversight, but rather a differently constituted Supreme Court comprising
judges selected by provinces as well as the federal government.3
A shift in constitutional tone and confidence began to mark the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada too. Writing in dissent in a
now largely forgotten criminal law decision in 1945, Chief Justice Rinfret
rather starkly announced that the case "may not be discussed from the
viewpoint of the English constitutional law. In this country we have to apply
the B.N.A. Act and the Criminal Code, two statutes which, of course, do
not apply in England." Further, he continued, since "the Supreme Court of
80. Those calls grew louder after the Privy Council struck down the majority of the New Deal
legislation in 1937. See FR Scott, "The Consequences of the Privy Council Decisions" (1937) 15:6
Can Bar Rev 485 at 494; WPM Kennedy, "The British North America Act: Past and Future" (1937)
15:6 Can Bar Rev 393; Vincent C MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years After"
(1937) 15:6 Can Bar Rev 401; FC Cronkite, "The Social Legislation References" (1937) 15:6 Can Bar
Rev 478.
81. Memorandum from FR Scott to Escott Reid, "Memorandum Re Appeals to the Privy Council" (4
November 1932), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (MG 30, D 211, vol 7, reel H-1218), online:
<http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac reel h1218/975?r-0&s-3>.
82. See House of Commons Debates, l8thParl, 3rd Sess, No 3 (8 April 1938) at 2190-2191 (Hon JH
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83. Quebec, Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, Report, vol 3 (Quebec:
Province of Quebec, 1956) at 287-296.
Canadian Constitutional Identities
Canada is now the court of last resort in criminal matters," Privy Council
decisions were no longer strictly binding. "For all these reasons," he
concluded, the present case "stands to be decided according to Canadian
law."84 Delayed by the Second World War, both the Supreme Court of
Canada and the Privy Council subsequently upheld as constitutional the
federal legislation making the Supreme Court of Canada the final court
of appeal in all legal matters. The Privy Council decision upholding the
constitutionality of Canada's new judicial hierarchy was particularly
direct. "[I]t must be within the power of the Dominion Parliament to enact
that the jurisdiction of its Supreme Court shall be ultimate," Lord Jowitt
held. "No other solution is consonant with the status of a self-governing
Dominion. "85
Canada entered the second half of the twentieth century in a
significantly different constitutional position than at any earlier time in
its history. The ideological battle between the imperialists and nationalists
had been decisively won in favour of those promoting the need for
Canadian constitutional independence. J.S. Ewart and Henri Bourassa,
once lonely voices against the constitutional establishment, now reflected
the mainstream insofar as they reflected the popular desire for Canadian
constitutional autonomy.86 The Statute of Westminster, 1931 had, in
Frank Scott's phrasing, ensured "[t]he [e]nd of [d]ominion [s]tatus," and
,complete national independence."" Flush with postwar confidence, in
1946, Canada enacted its first Canadian Citizenship Act, as an expression
of its growing sense of national distinctiveness and identity.88 For all
Canadian cases beginning in 1949, appeals to the Privy Council had been
abolished. In that same year, the British Parliament passed a constitutional
amendment granting Parliament circumscribed authority to amend the
constitution in respect of matters falling exclusively within federal
jurisdiction.89 A pleased Frank Scott heralded the beginning of Canada's
journey of "bringing to her shores that ultimate legislative authority
which, in spite of her complete political autonomy, has continued to rest in
84. In Re Storgoff [1945] SCR526 at 538, [1945] 3 DLR 673.
85. Ontario (AG) v Canada (AG), [1947] AC 127, [1947] 1 All ER 137.
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the Parliament of the United Kingdom."9 Others put that quest in sharper
terms. "We Canadians have stood about enough of this," a Maclean 's
editorial announced. "The fact that Canada still has to run to mother to
have her constitutional buttons done up is a national shame and we have
a right to expect serious, self-effacing efforts to remove it." If the current
batch of federal and provincial politicians was not able to work together to
find a constitutional solution, the editors warned, "we ought to think about
hiring ourselves a new set of politicians. "91
Canadians did have a new set ofjudges atop the judicial hierarchy, the
Supreme Court of Canada, although the question of whether Privy Council
precedents remained binding posed an unresolved question. For the most
part, the Court shied away from answering that query directly, although
Justice Ivan Rand, on his own (and in his own idiosyncratic judicial style),
seemed to suggest he ending of Privy Council appeals had brought about
a definitive break with the past:
The powers of this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction are no less in
scope than those formerly exercised in relation to Canada by the Judicial
Committee... [T]hat incident ofjudicial power must, now.., be exercised
in revising or restating those fornulations that have come down to us.
This is a function inseparable from constitutional decision. It involves
no departure from the basic principles of jurisdictional distribution; it is
rather a refinement of interpretation in application to the particularized
and evolving features and aspects of matters which the intensive and
extensive expansion of the life of the country inevitably presents.92
In envisioning a constitutional law in step with the "particularized" and
"evolving features" of "the life of the country," Justice Rand called for
a constitutional law fully attuned to the deeper currents of constitutional
identity. It is a search that continues to dominate Canadian constitutional
law.
90. FR Scott, "The British NorthAmerica Act (no. 2) Act, 1949" in Scott, Essays on the Constitution,
supra note 87, 202 at 202.
91. "It's Time Our Hired Hands Stopped Their Quarreling" Maclean ' Magazine (15 January 1950)
1 at 1.
92. Reference Re The Farm Products MarketingAct, [1957] SCR 198 at 212-213, 7 DLR (2d) 257.
Bora Laskin, especially anxious for a new direction in the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence,
called for the Court to embrace "the spirit of its new status" and free itself from the Privy Council's
doctrinal chains. Bora Laskin, "The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians"
(1951) 29:10 Can Bar Rev 1038 at 1057, 1076. Following Laskin's lead, other lawyers and scholars
filled the pages of the Canadian Bar Review in the decade that followed similarly demanding the
creation of an independent Canadian jurisprudence.
Canadian Constitutional Identities
III. Searching for a Canadian constitution
The decade of the 1960s in Canada and its various social, political, and
cultural upheavals has sparked a great deal of recent scholarly attention.
"Rather than oversimplify it as a decade of protest, we present the
'sixties' as a transformative era for Canadian society that was diffuse
and widespread," a recent collection notes.93 "[T]here can be no doubt,"
Dimitry Anastakis echoes, "that the period's transformative effect upon
Canadians-culturally, politically, and economically-was immense."
The rupture was not as sudden as has sometimes been imagined and,
indeed, the groundwork had been laid in the "intense cultural and social
negotiation" of the 1950s and the "constant shifting of axes between the
elements of tradition and modernity" that marked the immediate post-war
years.95 But it is true that the 1960s accelerated change across a variety of
social and cultural planes, although change was not especially pronounced
in either the common law or Canadian legal system as a whole. Certainly,
in relation to doctrinal matters, the 1960s was a period of relative calm
in Canadian constitutional law. With Justice Rand's retirement in 1959,
the Supreme Court had lost its only constitutional iconoclast, and the
excitement of the Rand-led "implied bill of rights" era largely ended when
he left the Court.96 With only one or two exceptions, the 1960s produced
virtually no leading constitutional law decisions or lasting doctrinal
developments of note beyond perhaps the slow incremental drift towards
greater acceptance of federal jurisdictional authority in division of powers
matters.9 The widely accepted transformative power of the 1960s, most
constitutional lawyers would be forced to admit, did not really extend to
Canadian constitutional law.
The life of the constitution, however, was more complex and dynamic
than its case law of the 1960s revealed. Historians agree that the period
witnessed intense political and cultural negotiation of the essential
elements of Canadian national identity. In one sense, there was nothing
especially new in this. "The elaboration of Canadian nationhood was... a
93. Lara Campbell & Dominique Clement, "Introduction: Time, Age, Myth: Towards a History of
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94. Dimitry Anastakis, The Sixties: Passion, Politics, and Style (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
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(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003) at 17.
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complicated historical process," Bryan Palmer argues, "one that unfolded
at the interface of worlds old and new. It reached across the expanse of
Canada's nineteenth and twentieth centuries, through two world wars and
multiple moments of independence-making. A colony came to see itself
as a nation."9 Yet a confluence of events and circumstances that inspired
soul-searching national debates marked the 1960s as unique. The Quiet
Revolution, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism,
the adoption of a new national flag, Canada's Centennial celebrations, the
premiers' Confederation of Tomorrow conference, and the intensifying
meetings between the provinces and federal government on a constitutional
amending formula and reform package, all offered opportunities to search
for, discuss, and disagree about the meaning of Canada in constitutional
terms.
In Peter Russell's apt description, the 1960s initiated the beginning
of a quarter century of "mega constitutional politics" in Canada. Mega
constitutional politics, Russell explains, "addresses the v ry nature of the
political community on which the constitution is based. Mega constitutional
politics... is concerned with reaching agreement on the identity and
fundamental principles of the body politic."99 Indeed, participants
seemed especially keen to approach such moments as opportunities to
define and express Canadian constitutional identity. So it was that the
Royal Commission's terms of reference asked for recommendations on
"what steps [should] be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation
on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races,"
taking into account "the contribution made by the other ethnic groups
to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be
taken to safeguard that contribution.""1 ' As John Saywell drily observed,
"[t]he Commissioners felt they had been called upon to refashion the state,
and not just its framework but its foundations.""1 ' It was difficult, Frank
Scott admitted as one of the Commissioners, to avoid the constitution in
the Commission's public hearings and deliberations. It was not the job of
the Commission, Scott protested, to "talk about the 'repatriation' of the
constitution, or to recommend the nature of the amending process," and
yet he acknowledged that the constitution-the special status of Quebec,
98. BryanD Palmer, Canadas 1960s: The Ironies ofldentity in a Rebellious Era (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2009) at 11.
99. Peter H Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?, 3rd ed
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) 75.
100. Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Report of the Royal Commission
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101. John T Saywell, "The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism" (1965) 20:3 Intl J
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the flexibility or rigidity of fiscal and federal arrangements, the amending
process-was "going on around us". "We have a rendez-vous with the
BNA Act," Scott often claimed in his speeches on constitutional matters.
"It's going to come some day!"1 2 The moment of rendez-vous had, for all
intents and purposes, already arrived.
Historians have generally agreed that one of the powerful undercurrents
in Canada's intensifying search for national identity in the 1960s was
the erosion and replacement of several of the symbols of Canada's
Britishness. While some accounts emphasize Prime Minister Pearson
and the Liberal government's engineered "crisis of Britishness,"103 as we
have seen, Canada's constitutional nationalists had long identified overt
British constitutional symbols as indicative of an absence of distinctive
constitutional maturity. Whatever its derivation, that profound change
was taking place in Canada's self-understanding was obvious for
contemporaries."4 Most famously, George Grant's Lament for a Nation:
The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism, published in 1965, set out a forceful
elegy mourning the loss of "the Britishness of Canada" at the expense
of American-dominated liberal capitalism.0 5 For Grant, the regrettable,
inevitable, and certainly destructive, transition had occurred because of
a loss of tradition, a forgetting of the past, and a betrayal of heritage by
Canada's wealthy and powerful for economic gain. But liberalism meant
more than economics, J.A. Corry stressed in his 1971 Massey Lectures.
"In Canada, for a long time it was generally believed that the British
tradition of public law... was strong enough among us to give adequate
protection to civil rights," he argued. "It has been realized," he continued,
"that Canada lacks the social homogeneity of Britain. We, like the United
States, are a people of diverse origins and differing cultural traditions."
"[W]e are pulled one way by our traditions," he concluded, "and another
102. FR Scott, "Address" (Delivered at the Joint Dinner of the Association of Canadian Law Teachers
and the Canadian Political Science Association at Charlottetown, PEI, 11 June 1964) in P-A Crepeau
& CB MacPherson, eds, The Future of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
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way by realizing that North America is not Britain."1°6 "On both sides of
the debate," C.P. Champion writes, "the confrontation with Britishness
was a struggle over the meaning of Canada and Canadianism, and the role
of memory, history, and heritage in imagining the Dominion." '
Perhaps nowhere was this battle better reflected than in the divisive
debates surrounding the adoption of the red maple leaf as Canada's
national flag. From the outset, Pearson framed the adoption of a new
national flag as "part of the large question of national unity." ' First the
Quiet Revolution and then the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism had revealed disquiet and disappointment in francophone
Quebec and strains of hostility and indifference in English Canada towards
the current federal arrangements in Canada. Seeking new symbols of
national unity, Pearson and the Liberals forwarded the idea of a new flag
that would "symbolize and be a true reflection of [a] new Canada.' 10 9 It
was true, Pearson conceded, that Canadians "had a responsibility to the
past. But we have also a greater responsibility to the present and to the
future."110 In parliamentary debates, the flag and its symbolism easily and
frequently evoked the search for Canadian constitutional identity. "[I]t is
one of the unique ironies of Canadian history," John Diefenbaker, leader
of the Progressive Conservative opposition observed, "that parliament
should halt consideration of the question of national flags in order to make
an application, by way of address to the British parliament, to ask that
house to amend the Canadian constitution." "[I]t is not Westminster that
exercises by its own wish this authority over Canada," Diefenbaker argued.
"It is the failure of Canadians to build within this nation one Canada.1 11
But, if Diefenbaker had correctly identified a constitutional failure,
it was increasingly one of details and not desire. The demand for
constitutional autonomy and independence crossed all party lines and
united the Canadian public more broadly. While the imagery of the new
flag drove wedges between liberals and conservatives, political opponents
agreed that Canada needed a new constitution in line with its constitutional
identity as a mature and sophisticated nation state. Stanley Knowles for
106. JA Cony, The Power of Law (Toronto: Hunter Rose, 1971) at 50. Looking back over the same
period, Alan Cairns observed that the "relaxation of the British grip on Canadian constitutional
identity" manifest itself in a "great burst of nationalist activity in the years just after the war." Cairns,
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the New Democratic Party expressed a common sentiment that "it is
something less than dignified for us to be talking so much as we are these
days about our nationhood and independence, and yet forever to be going
through this form of getting an amendment to our own constitution by
having to send a request to the legislative halls of another country."'112 Ral
Caouette, of the Social Credit Party, raised again the idea of a constitution
lost in its own archaic history.
I think that the constitution would have been brought back long ago,
and I wonder whether the original text has not been lost abroad, so that
one would be able to determine whose signature it bears. For the past
ten years or so, there has always been some talk about the constitution.
I have begun to wonder whether the Minister of Justice will not, some
day, state that the constitution having been put on some dusty shelf in the
parliament of Westminster, the original text has been irretrievably lost,
so that we should make out a new one here, in this parliament."3
Equal parts fantasy, distrust of the Liberals, and criticism, Caouette evoked
the strange image of a constitution literally lost in dust. The remedy he
claimed, like others before and alongside him, was the fashioning of a
new domestic constitution "conceived by Canadians for Canadians."1 4
In this light, the British North America Act (now the Constitution Act,
1867, strategically renamed to cut ties with its past) ceased to be the real
constitution, but a foreign imposter. "We must eventually nationalize the
constitution," Frank Scott argued, "[and] get rid of one anomaly called the
British North America Act, replacing that obsolete title by the Constitution
of Canada."'115
This strange constitutional duality-the disjuncture between a foreign
formal constitutional instrument and an authentic but ephemeral domestic
constitutional spirit-may explain in part the prevalence of the language
of repatriation in constitutional debates, and the image of returning the
constitution home. The expression became synonymous with the movement
to amend Canada's constitution with a domestic amending formula and,
eventually, the adoption of a bill of rights. "The very term 'repatriation' is,
of course, misleading," Saskatchewan's attorney general, Robert Walker,
pointed out. "We cannot repatriate the constitution because it has never
112. House of Commons Debates, 26th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 4 (18 June 1964) at 4465 (Hon Stanley
Knowles).
113. House of Commons Debates, 26th Part, 2nd Sess, No 4 (18 June 1964) at 4472 (Hon Real
Caouette).
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been a fully Canadian instrument... We are... still groping for our national
maturity and the search for a Canadian constitution, amendable in Canada,
is only one aspect of this evolutionary process."'116 Nonetheless the label
stuck (although patriation was common too), perhaps because it resonated
with the view of Canadian constitutionalism as historically "sprung from
their own soil." ' An amended constitution, from this perspective, was
not a new instrument, but an old one, returning home. The language of
repatriation also extended the implicit suggestion that a constitution could
exist in multiples: domestic and foreign, informal and formal, real and
unreal. In such a state of confusion, what else could a nation do but turn
to deeper principles of constitutional identity to discern authenticity from
doppelganger? What else to do but, in Walker's evocative phrase, "search
for a Canadian constitution.
11 8
In many ways, the sense of purpose in that search tended to downplay
the difficulties inherent in the looking. By 1968 the Government of Canada
announced a new round of constitutional negotiations with the express
intention of adopting a new Canadian constitution with an amending
formula and a charter of human rights. Credited to Prime Minister Pearson
but drafted by Pierre Trudeau, the Government of Canada's policy
statement recognized that "a constitution is more than a legal document;
it is an expression of how the people within a state may achieve their
social, economic and cultural aspirations through the exercise and
control of political authority. We must look therefore to the essential
nature of the Canadian federation in examining our Constitution."19
There was to be little consensus on what that essential nature entailed
in the decade that followed. Diversity or unity? Biculturalism or multi-
nationalism? Centralization or decentralization? Judicial enforcement of
rights or parliamentary sovereignty? The quest for a singular unifying
and constitutive vision of Canada's constitutional identity was fraught
with disagreement, exclusion, and recriminations. Aboriginal peoples,
citizens whose background was neither British nor French, and other
historically marginalized social groups did not always see themselves in
the new constitutional project. And constitutional priorities, unified by a
spirit of constitutional nationalism, fractured again in the face of drafting
116. RA Walker, "Repatriating the Constitution" (Address delivered to the Saskatoon Bar Association,
17 February 1961), (1961) 26 Sask Bar Rev & L Society's Gaz 12 at 12.
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and agreeing on new constitutional principles to govern Canada's next
century, as the divisions exposed by patriation, and the Meech Lake and
Charlottetown Accords made clear. The search for constitutional identities,
despite moments of powerful consensus, will always unfold "with a mix
of defiant realities.""12 Canada ended its first century as a nation unified in
the need for formal constitutional change to satisfy an array of unfulfilled
constitutional identities, but divided by unseen disagreements about which
identities should predominate.
Conclusion
Although the search for constitutional identity is often premised on the
singular identification of essential and true qualities of the constitution,
the process of searching reveals the inherently plural, contradictory, and
messy nature of constitutional identities in complex polities. The same is
inevitably true in the quest to define other aspects of national identity in
art, culture, or history. Amidst the national constitutional soul searching of
the 1960s, parallel movements across the humanities and social sciences
engaged in similar searches for meaning in Canada's past and present.
Canadian historians, led by W.L. Morton and Donald Creighton, aimed
to definitively canvass the history of Canada in the Canadian Centenary
Series. In Canadian political science, Donald Smiley's The Canadian
Political Nationality reinterpreted the past, present, and future of the
Canadian political state.121 In Canadian literature, Carl Klinck's edited
Literary History of Canada testified to the existence of a distinctive and
worthy literary tradition in English Canada.' The volume is especially
well known for Northrop Frye's concluding essay in which he confidently
articulated his famous "garrison mentality" as a unifying theme in
Canadian literature and suggested that the question underlying the search
for Canadian identity was not so much "Who am I?" as "Where is here?"23
In his much less well known Whidden Lectures delivered at McMaster
University shortly afterwards, in the nationalistic glow of the centennial
year, Frye elliptically expressed more ambivalence and less certainty on
the question of Canadian identity. "My present task, I think, is neither
to eulogize nor to elegize Canadian nationality, neither to celebrate its
survival nor to lament its passage," he explained.24 "All nations have.., a
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buried or uncreated ideal, the lost world of the lamb and the child, and no
nation has been more preoccupied with it than Canada."'125 Canadian art
and literature, he observed, "seems constantly to be trying to understand
something that eludes it, frustrated by a sense that there is something to be
found that has not been found." "The Canada to which we really do owe
loyalty," Frye concluded "is the Canada that we have failed to create. In a
year to be full of discussions of our identity, I should like to suggest that
our identity, like the real identity of all nations, is the one that we have
failed to achieve. It is expressed in our culture, but not attained in our
life ."126
Frye might well have been speaking of the Canadian constitution. The
search for Canadian constitutional identity has been an endemic feature of
our constitutional history, one driven, more often than not, by a desire to
create and express something distinctive and organic about the Canadian
constitutional experience. The search itself revealed deep engagement with
Canada's constitutionalism, most prominently among elites in law and
politics, but also more broadly in popular constitutional culture, especially
journalism. As Peter Waite has shown, newspapers provided "continuous,
almost exhaustive" treatment of Confederation because Canadians
cared deeply about the topic, quite rationally recognizing that Canada's
constitutional arrangements had direct and meaningful impact on their
lives.127 Although I have cited only a smattering of journalists here, the
same observation can be made about the media's relationship to Canada's
constitutional status, dilemmas, and controversies of the twentieth century.
More often than not, the constitutional message delivered to the doorsteps
of Canadians in newspapers and magazines, especially in English
Canada, was that Canada's constitutional maturity, independence, and
distinctiveness must be reflected in its formal constitutional law. Formally
expressing that autonomy and defining that distinctiveness in constitutional
text proved more difficult than demanding the need for them. In this way,
the search for Canada's constitutional identity (certainly one that could
unite the disparate elements of the polity) often proved elusive-the search
for lost meaning that could not be found. And yet, Frye gestures to the
hopeful possibility that identity, if it resides beyond precise and a priori
definition in some perfect past or Aristotelian form, finds real expression
and meaning in the broader cultural life which sustains it. Frye raises the
intriguing possibility that Canadian constitutional identity may exist as
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no definitive destination beyond the rich and productive negotiations of
the journey to find it; a constitutional identity, in other words, of inquiry,
negotiation, and relationships. Such a constitutional identity of process
and relations might explain a constitutional law, politics, and culture
of balanced federalism, reconciliation between Crown and aboriginal
sovereignties, and proportionate limits on rights and freedoms.
I conclude with the thoughts and words of the constitutional
thinker with whom this article began. Recall John Sanborn's belief
that the power of a constitution lay in its ability to secure affection as
an idea, ideal, and identity that resonated in the hearts of citizens. In
the Confederation debates, he commended a constitution of the heart as
a bulwark against change, so that it might resist innovation. A decade
later, his experience deepened and nuanced by time in politics and law,
his position had changed. An enthusiastic crowd gathered to hear Justice
Sanborn's evening lecture on 15 February 1876 in the Reading Rooms of
the Young Men's Christian Association in downtown Montreal. His topic
was "The British Constitution" and his address began with a recitation of
the period's typical observations about the virtues of the Magna Carta,
habeas corpus, trial by jury, and the rule of law. But Sanborn ended his
talk in a different vein. Turning his attention to "the constitution of the
Dominion of Canada," Sanborn described its features for his lay audience
but emphasized, in particular, "the various steps that have been taken to
improve it." "[A]lthough great progress has been made," he averred, "it is
not perfect". "[W]e should, while cherishing it," he concluded, "use our
best endeavo[u]rs to further improve it, and thus become a really great
and noble people.""12 Although Sanborn had previously counselled the
necessity of resistance to constitutional change, he now saw a different set
of lived constitutional attributes worth promoting. A constitution was still
to be cherished, still a matter of the heart and not simply the mind, but now
it was less a static object of reverence than a process of experience to be
worked and reworked in reach of a distant destination of greatness, virtue,
and justice. Above all, it was still a constitution of the people with its
future held firmly and resolutely in their hands. Rising to their feet at the
conclusion of Sanborn's remarks, the crowd heartily cheered, and headed
out into the crisp winter air of a Montreal night to live their lives under a
constitution they could not see, but was everywhere around them.
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